Evidence the run may read
- Vendor evidence package
- Proposed data and access scope
- Internal risk policy
production blueprint · security
Third-party security review agent blueprint.
Synthesize vendor evidence, data access, architecture, and open risks into an approval-ready security assessment.
Search intent: AI agent for third-party security reviews
Published by a2a cloudProduct-source methodology →
01 · the contract
Start from a bounded job, not a blank chat box.
trigger
A new vendor or material vendor change enters security review.
owner
security owner
agent stops at
The designated security risk owner accepts, conditions, or rejects the vendor risk.
KPI · decrease
vendor security review cycle time (days). Measure complete evidence receipt to risk-owner decision.
outputs
Artifacts the run must produce
- Control coverage matrix
- Residual risk register
- Approval conditions
02 · topology
Small specialists. Named handoffs. One accountable decision.
Each stage produces an artifact another stage can inspect. The final node is a person, not an autonomous write to an external system.
- 01
intake
Validate and normalize the third-party security review inputs.
- 02
vendor evidence analyst
Produce the control coverage matrix.
- 03
data-flow reviewer
Produce the residual risk register.
- 04
third-party risk reviewer
Challenge the third-party security review result and prepare an approval packet.
- 05
security owner
The designated security risk owner accepts, conditions, or rejects the vendor risk.
intake→ validated input packet →vendor-evidence-analyst
vendor-evidence-analyst→ Control coverage matrix →data-flow-reviewer
data-flow-reviewer→ Residual risk register →third-party-risk-reviewer
third-party-risk-reviewer→ approval packet with evidence references →human-approver
03 · authority
Grant the run only what this case needs.
Source material is read-only. Drafts land in a case-specific output path. Tools may read or propose; the human gate owns the external write.
case inputs
workspace/security/third-party-security-review/inputs/**Read only the evidence attached to this workflow instance.
case outputs
workspace/security/third-party-security-review/outputs/**Write drafts and evidence artifacts without modifying source records.
approved tools
security:third-party-security-review:read-or-proposeInvoke only tools explicitly granted for this run; external writes remain gated.
04 · implementation
A private, bounded starting manifest.
The blueprint starts private, caps its DAG, disables replanning, and exposes no public endpoint. Add only the tools and data adapters this workflow has approved.
a2a.yamlsafe starting point
name: security-third-party-security-review
version: 0.1.0
entrypoint: agent:BlueprintAgent
expose:
public: false
composition:
planning: deterministic_dag
max_nodes: 6
max_parallel: 3
max_replans: 005 · acceptance test
Pass only with evidence.
- 01
Evidence traceability
Every material conclusion cites an input artifact or a scoped tool result from this run.
- 02
Residual risks are tied to the proposed use, not generic vendor posture alone.
Residual risks are tied to the proposed use, not generic vendor posture alone.
- 03
Approval boundary
The run stops at a proposal and records the human decision before any external side effect.
failure containment
Stop small. Preserve the evidence.
Required vendor evidence is absent, expired, or inconsistent with the proposed architecture.
Containment: Return a partial result with unresolved items; do not broaden scope or perform an external write.
Operator: Attach the missing evidence, narrow the brief, or explicitly approve a new scoped run.
A required input or tool grant is unavailable.
Containment: Stop the affected branch and preserve completed artifacts in the case output workspace.
Operator: Grant only the missing resource or continue with that branch marked out of scope.
06 · proof
Sign the run facts. Keep money in the billing ledger.
Current platform receipts sign caller identity or classification, skill, bounded input evidence, verified grant IDs when present, outcome or result preview, and timing. Optional file, tool, artifact, handoff, evaluation, and review fields require separate instrumentation and are not populated by default. Price, fees, payouts, and later human approvals remain separate platform records.
The example uses only fields populated by the current platform sealing paths. It is illustrative, not a record of a real customer run.
ExecutionReceipt · selected fieldsEd25519 token
{
"receipt_id": "rcpt_01J...",
"schema_version": 1,
"agent_name": "security-third-party-security-review",
"caller": "user:workflow-owner",
"task_id": "case_third_party_security_review",
"skill_name": "third_party_security_review",
"input_hash": "4d7c...9a2f",
"grant_ids": [
"grt_case_inputs",
"grt_tool_propose"
],
"status": "ok",
"result_preview": "Output prepared: Control coverage matrix. Human decision remains separate.",
"elapsed_ms": 4218
}related blueprints
Keep the operating model consistent.
Security
Vulnerability triage
Combine scanner evidence, asset context, exploitability signals, and compensating controls into a reviewed priority decision.
Security
Secrets exposure response
Build an exposure timeline, affected-resource list, and rotation plan without copying secret values into artifacts.
Security
Access review evidence
Normalize account and entitlement exports, flag anomalous access, and produce a reviewer-ready certification packet.
put the pattern to work
Start private. Scope the authority. Require the decision.
Deploy the workflow as a bounded internal agent, verify its outputs and the receipt fields actually emitted, then expand only the scopes your acceptance test proves it needs.